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Abstract 
 
Losses are part of the human condition. And these losses are multifaceted – as diverse as 
human bonds can be. In this paper I review and analyze the diversity of loss experiences and 
the notion of loss of self. A sociology of loss illuminates the universes of meaning that refer 
to person/person, person/animal, or person/object relations and involve different kinds of 
losses that can be grieved. It also broaches the issue of the social regulation of losses and 
specific loss norms. Finally, I will present a general model that integrates the various 
perspectives on loss. 
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1. Introduction 
Loss is an elementary human experience and refers to the transitory nature of human 
existence, an existence to which parting is immanent. Valediction is not an act pertaining to 
death only. In our lifetimes, we also have to sever from places, attitudes, love, health, 
thoughts, home, pets, or dreams. A sociology of loss has to take this diversity of strong 
attachments into account. Loss and society are closely connected. Migration or war, for 
instance, include losses such as deaths or disappearances (Mellibovsky, 1997), or losses of 
culture and language. The insights to be gained by looking at loss, however, are not limited to 
such exceptional circumstances. Losses occurring during “normal” life have the power to 
illuminate the great variety of human ties and the diversity of the bonds between the self and 
others (Lofland, 1985, p.181). Sociology can also sensitize awareness to how society shapes 
private loss experiences with regard to definitions, framing processes, and the social norms 
governing special categories of losses. Different kinds of losses involve different social 
understandings of what is considered a “legitimate loss” (Fowlkes, 1990), thus evoking 
different “grievability” (Butler, 2009). The acknowledgement of a loss depends on the prior 
acknowledgement of life or existence. Not all losses can be mourned equally (Butler, 2009). 
Losses that are not acknowledged have been called disenfranchised losses (Doka, 2002), 
demoralized or illegitimate losses (Fowlkes, 1990). These include, for example, the loss of 
pets, ending of homosexual relationships, or deaths by suicide.  
A sociology of loss is closely connected with a sociology of emotions and a sociology of the 
self (Callero, 2003). Emotions of loss include separation distress (Archer, 1999), sadness 
(Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007), or nostalgia (Davis, 1979). Nonetheless, grief after the death 
of a loved one is the emotional response defined as the prototypical loss reaction (Horwitz and 
Wakefield, 2007). According to Cochran and Claspell (1987), grief can be understood as a 
“story of loss”. Interestingly, the emotion of grief – as a general concept – can be applied to 
various losses, not only to the death of humans (Marris, 1986). There is evidence to suggest 
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that the severing of any relationship of some significance may result in a “grief-like response” 
(Lofland, 1985, p.182) because the experience of loss is always related to identity (Charmaz, 
1980, p.282). Change and transitions (Marris, 1986; Nisbet, 1970) indicate loss. Both events 
are associated with crisis. This crisis is based on the inability of humans to continue any 
longer in the accustomed way in the face of such an event (Nisbet, 1970, p.317). Therefore 
change implies a loss of control and threat to the continuity of everyday life and the self 
(Marris, 1986, p.3; Nisbet, 1970, p.317). As Charmaz (1980, p.282) argues, “the experience of 
loss is related to personal identity”. Any significant loss can cause a “crisis of the self” 
(Charmaz, 1997, p.232). Another field of research addresses critical life events, such as 
divorce, the death of a loved one, or the loss of one’s job, as exogenous shocks (Ormel, 
Lindenberg, Steverink, and Verbrugge, 1999). 
The paper is based on the previous work of Charmaz (1980, 1983, 1997), Lofland (1982, 
1985), Marris (1986), and Hahn (1968), who explored the relationship between death and 
identity. My aim is to deepen the notion of loss of self (Charmaz, 1980; Marris, 1986) based 
on a diversified conception of significant others to account for the “broader context of loss”, 
as proposed by Lofland (1985, p.182). I will draw on symbolic interactionism (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1965 [1934]) to highlight the role of significant others 
for the self. The main purpose is to demonstrate the diversity of losses based on the role of 
various “others” in self-construction, self-maintenance, and self-continuity. Therefore the 
concept of loss of self and the accompanying emotion of grief can be a result of the loss of 
persons, animals, as well as material or immaterial objects. Section 2 provides an overview of 
different categories of loss. The role of these diverse “others” for self-construction and self-
maintenance will be discussed in section 3. Intimate and social bonds, as Fowlkes (1990, 
p.636) is correct to point out, are more widespread and complex than conventionally 
imagined. Special emphasis is placed on the role of human/animal bonds (e.g. Irvine, 2004a, 
2004b; Sanders, 1990) and the meaning of objects for self-identity (e.g. Belk, 1988, 2013; 
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Rochberg-Halton, 1984; Silver, 1996). As a consequence, these various losses can result in a 
loss of self, including grief reactions (section 4). Similarities and differences of psychological 
notions of loss and self will be discussed in section 5. Finally, I will develop a general model 
to integrate the various perspectives of loss (section 6). The article concludes by summarizing 
the main aspects and by providing an outline of a sociology of loss (section 7). 
 
2. Categories of Loss  
Blumer’s first fundamental principle of symbolic interactionism, “Human beings act toward 
things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them” (Blumer, 1969, p.2), 
provides the theoretical starting point of the following considerations. A multiplicity of 
“things” has significance and meaning for individuals. Lofland (1982, p.219) defines a loss 
experience as “the involuntary severance (…) of a relationship defined by the actor as 
‘significant’ or ‘meaningful’”. The concept of bereavement generally refers to “social loss, of 
person, relationship, status, and way of being” (Wallace, 1973, p.231). Loss experiences are 
not restricted to the death of a loved one only – they can imply a lost “something” as well 
(Walter, 1999, p.x). Yet, most of the bereavement literature focuses on death because it 
represents the most severe loss and a radical disruption of life, relationships, and the self 
(Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007; Marris, 1986). According to Berger and Luckmann (1966, 
p.119), death “posits the most terrifying threat to the taken-for-granted realities of everyday 
life”. Consequently, death is characterized as the “marginal situation par excellence for the 
individual” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.118-119). From a sociological standpoint, 
however, we must acknowledge the heterogeneity of losses. Table 1 summarizes major 
categories and types of loss. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Losses can be classified along two dimensions: personhood/artifact and 
materiality/immateriality. This allows sorting loss experiences into three general categories: 
1) relationship loss (person, animal), 2) status loss (way of being, such as health, culture, or 
job), and 3) (im)material object loss (e.g. artifacts, places, ideals). Modes of relationship loss 
include death or the end of a relationship, such as divorce or separation. The bereavement 
literature primarily addresses the death of a nuclear family member and dependent 
relationships, especially of a spouse or child. Yet, intimate bonds are not limited to the 
nuclear family only but may also include friends, colleagues, kin, or companion animals 
(Fowlkes, 1990). A unique form of loss is associated with abortion and miscarriage (Frost, 
Bradley, Levitas, Smith, and Garcia, 2007). 
Different kinds of losses can be classified according to a series of opposites: choice vs. force, 
interchangeability vs. uniqueness, voluntariness vs. involuntariness and finality vs. openness. 
For example, the death of a loved one (personhood) can be characterized as forced, 
involuntary, and final, whereas the loss of a job or home in some cases can be described as 
chosen, interchangeable, and voluntary (for example, if I decide to quit my job for a better 
offer and this leads me to leave my hometown). There are also different types of losses 
referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary loss (e.g. Stroebe and Schut, 1999). Whereas 
primary losses refer to the loss of an attachment figure, secondary and tertiary losses include 
losses of one’s home or financial losses as consequences of the death of a significant other 
(Stroebe and Schut, 1999, p.210). 
 
3. The Self and Significant Others 
Symbolic interactionism focuses on the social construction of the self and the role of 
significant others in self-definition and reality maintenance (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1965 [1934]). It is the dominant theoretical approach to the self 
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(Callero, 2003, p.116) and provides the basic understanding of the notion of “loss of self” in 
case of the loss experiences that will be discussed in the next section.
i
 
Cooley (1983 [1902], p.179) defines the self as a looking-glass self drawn from the 
communicative and general life that is deeply connected with the thought of other persons. 
The self is realized in relationships to others (Mead, 1965 [1934], p.204). The “me” is 
constituted by social relationships; it reflects the attitudes of the others (Mead, 1965 [1934], 
p.176). The mechanism of role taking and the language process (interaction and 
communication) are important for the development of the self. The self is described as a 
“reflected entity, reflecting the attitudes first taken by significant others towards it; the 
individual becomes what he is addressed as by his significant others” (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p.152). However, Berger and Luckmann (1966, p.152) emphasize that this is not a 
“one-sided, mechanistic process” because it “entails a dialectic between identification by 
others and self-identification”. Significant others play an important role for self-definition and 
reality maintenance. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966, p.170), they are “important 
for the ongoing confirmation of that crucial element of reality we call identity”. They are 
labeled as “principal agents” for the maintenance of reality to which “less significant others 
serve as a sort of chorus” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.170). The self is constituted 
through interaction with the generalized other in which the attitudes of groups or the society 
as a whole become internalized as part of the self (Mead, 1965 [1934], p.154). In the words of 
Charmaz (1983, p.170), the self-concept is the “organization of attributes that have become 
consistent over time”. This requires empirical validation in everyday life and in social 
interaction with significant others. Due to the social nature of the self, socialization is a 
lifelong process which results in changes in the self-concept throughout the life cycle 
(Charmaz, 1983, p.170). Self-identity – a term used by Silver (1996, p.3) – pertains to the 
individual’s subjective sense of the continuous and coherent nature of his or her biography. 
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Accordingly, a significant loss can induce a “crisis of self” (Charmaz, 1997) by disrupting this 
continuity. 
In addition to the traditional Meadian account of the social foundation of the self, I would like 
to elaborate the idea of animals as significant others and the concept of possessions as 
elements of an extended self. This important amendment provides the theoretical foundation 
for the understanding of loss of self in cases of losing a pet or a significant object. Companion 
animals – a term preferred by some to “pet” (Irvine, 2004a) – act as significant and subjective 
others for the owner; owner and animal both form an “acting unit” (Irvine, 2004a, p.3; 
Sanders, 1990, p.664). Although this kind of social bond can also be significant, it has been 
generally underrated or even pathologized (Walsh, 2009b). The bond between human and 
animal provides important social experiences that can serve for purposes of self-definition 
(Sanders, 1990, p.664). In particular, there are two functions of companion animals. First, 
they are “social facilitators” for extended social involvements (Sanders, 1990, p.663). 
Animals extend the interaction situations in which the owner acquires information about how 
she or he is defined by others (Sanders, 1990, p.662).  And second, companion animals have 
“personhood” and act as surrogates for human others, family members, or close friends (e.g. 
Archer, 1996; Walsh, 2009a). For Meyers (2002, p.252), pet ownership is indeed not just a 
substitute for human relations. It stands on its own, characterized by multiple threads of 
connections. Animals are significant others and grant rewards such as companionship and 
affection and serve as a source of security (Sanders, 1990; Archer, 1996). Moreover, studies 
provide empirical evidence of the value of animals for psychological and physical health and 
well-being (e.g. Archer, 1996; Beck and Katcher, 2003; Wells, 2009). In Irvine’s terms 
(2004a, p.87), living with animals “evokes new potential ways of being”, such as emotions or 
ways of life. Companion animals are “actors capable of a biography” (Bergmann, 1988) and 
have communicative resources. We experience them as “beings” that develop a character of 
their own, a personality with special likes and dislikes, successes and failures. As a 
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consequence, they are addressed as “conscious, purposeful partners” in social interaction 
(Irvine, 2004b, p.4). Especially dogs show affection, loyalty, attentiveness, and attachment to 
their owners (Archer, 1996, p.251). We live and grow older with them; we share meaning and 
emotions and develop daily routines that define the relationship (Bergmann, 1988; Irvine, 
2004a). Companion animals are not interchangeable (Irvine, 2004a, p.87). Animals and 
humans share feelings, intentions, and thoughts. The bond can be characterized as an 
“experience of self with other” (Irvine, 2004a, p.146). For example, animals can verify who 
we are while we interact with them or confirm our self and our own history (Irvine, 2004a, 
p.16, p.127). Animals have the features of agency, coherence, affectivity, and history that 
constitute a sort of selfhood (for a more detailed account, see Irvine 2004a, 2004b, 2007). 
Consequently, animals are seen as resources for self-construction and participants in the 
process of self-formation of humans (Irvine, 2004a, p.162). 
Furthermore, the importance of meaningful material objects for self-definition and self-
continuity is acknowledged (Belk, 1988, 2013; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981; 
Rochberg-Halton, 1984; Silver, 1996). For Rochberg-Halton (1984, p.335), valued material 
possessions act as “signs” and representations of the self, “because they can tell us, who we 
are, what we do, and who and what we might become” (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-
Halton, 1981, p.29-38; Rochberg-Halton, 1984, p.339). Objects involve meaning and 
memories; they can be part of our biography (Belk, 1988, p.142). They are “tools” for self-
definition (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981, p.92) and objectify the self 
(Rochberg-Halton, 1984, p.337). Interestingly and of importance for these arguments, 
Rochberg-Halton (1984, p.338-339) reminds us of a statement by Mead (1965 [1934]) 
concerning the role of inanimate objects (and animals) serving as elements of the generalized 
other: 
It is possible for inanimate objects, no less than for other human organisms, to form parts of the 
generalized and organized – the completely socialized – other for any given human individual, in so far as 
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he responds to such objects socially or in a social fashion (by means of the mechanism of thought, the 
internalized conversation of gestures). Any thing – any object or set of objects, whether animate or 
inanimate, human or animal, or merely physical – toward which he acts, or to which he responds, 
socially, is an element in what for him is the generalized other; by taking the attitudes of which toward 
himself he becomes conscious of himself as an object or individual, and thus develops a self or 
personality. (p.154, footnote 7) 
 
In this context, Belk (1988) identifies several links between the self and inanimate objects. 
First, possessions serve as a sort of self-extension that occurs through control and mastery of 
an object (Belk, 1988, p.139). In this case, possessions are incorporated into the self-concept 
(Belk, 1988, p.140). They constitute the “extended self” because material objects are 
“symbolic representations of the self to others (…) whereby actors construct and bolster their 
self-concept” (Sanders, 1990, p.662). Artifacts such as stuffed animals, books, or collections 
can serve as an “anchor” of identity designating early stages of a biography or as “markers” 
denoting transitional objects between different life stages (Silver, 1996, p.6). Especially 
stuffed animals can be emotional objects signifying friendship, comfort, or nurturance 
(Rochberg-Halton, 1984, p.356). Second, the role of possessions in creating or maintaining a 
sense of the past is emphasized. In the event of death, the meaning of personal reminders for 
the survivors is highlighted (e.g., photographs, personal possessions of the deceased) 
(Rosenblatt, 2006). Possessions of the deceased symbolize identities and become objects of 
commemoration (Unruh, 1983, p.344). In general, possessions help to achieve a sense of 
continuity by creating and maintaining an awareness of the past through storing memories and 
feelings attached to the past (Belk, 1988, p.139). From this point of view, belongings 
represent a “source of meaning” (Rosenblatt, 2006). They are more than just memories 
because they define feelings and personalize the significant other and the relationship between 
survivor and the deceased (Rosenblatt, 2006, p.103). They serve as “identity anchors” 
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(Charmaz and Milligan, 2006) or “linking objects” (Meyers, 2002) to keep alive the bond 
with the dead.  
In a recent update to his initial article (Belk, 1988), Belk (2013) additionally discusses the role 
of digital possessions and modifies his arguments to accommodate the construction of a 
digital self. Taking account of technological change, Belk identifies several changes in the 
nature of possessions. He notes that people develop a similar attachment to virtual possessions 
as they do to their physical counterparts; losses of the former are mourned accordingly. Yet 
digital goods often come with greater uncertainty in matters of control and ownership, and the 
experience of less authentic and valuable digital possessions makes them a less efficacious 
means for self-extension (Belk, 2013). The importance of sensual experience and developing 
a relationship with the object is implied. These considerations notwithstanding, physical and 
virtual possessions both remain important for the extended self.  
 
4. The Loss of Self  
In the center of the symbolic-interactionist perspective on bereavement, we find the concept 
of loss of self (Charmaz, 1980; Marris, 1986). This concept is predominantly applied to a 
particular loss, the death of a significant (human) other. It is interesting to note, however, that 
it is also used as a broader concept that demonstrates the diversity of loss experiences.  
When the “other” dies, the social nature of the self becomes painfully obvious. It is not only 
the loss of a loved human, animal, or object but also of the self that was constructed through 
the relationship with the other (Bradbury, 1999, p.175; Valentine, 2008, p.97). A loss 
generally destroys significant dimensions of the self of the survivor: “The fundamental crisis 
of bereavement arises, not from the loss of others, but the loss of self” (Marris, 1986, p.32f.). 
The loss of self refers to the social identity of individuals. In the Meadian tradition, we can 
describe this loss as a loss of the social me(s). Every “me,” in Abels’ words (2010, p.270), 
stems from the memory of others, their reactions toward us and their actual presence, 
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expectations, and identification. Especially family members play a crucial role in developing 
the self and maintaining reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). The loss of a group member 
has fundamental consequences for the survivor’s mental representation of the world. Losses 
cause a “disintegration of identity” (Marris, 1986, p.38). The concept of loss of self is 
supported by counselors who describe grieving as “falling apart” or “falling to pieces” during 
bereavement (Àrnason, 2007). Charmaz (1980) refers to the intensity of loss feelings and the 
definition of a significant loss. A significant loss occurs when one’s life or aspects of one’s 
life and self are tied in with the person, animal, or object that is gone. Therefore, it is of 
particular importance to analyze the individual framing and subjective meaning of the lost 
object for the self. Otherwise we will not be able to understand the emotional reaction to and 
consequences of a loss. As Charmaz (1980) argues, “the extent of loss depends upon how 
immersed the identity of the bereaved is in the circumstances within which the loss is felt” 
(p.282).  
The sociological concept of threads of connectedness (Lofland, 1982, 1985) best describes the 
multi-dimensional connections that are disrupted by relationship loss. Lofland (1982, p.222-
231) highlights the following links between the self and others: role partner, mundane 
assistance, linkages to others, the creation and maintenance of self, support for comforting 
myths, reality maintenance, and maintenance of possible futures. One source of emptiness, 
depression, sadness, or disorientation that occurs after the death of a loved one is the loss of 
social context or a loss of foundation in dealing with the loss (Cochran and Claspell, 1987, 
p.77; Rosenblatt, 2006, p.102). With regard to specific categories of loss, miscarriage, for 
instance, is associated with the “loss of possibility” (Frost et al., 2007) and “loss of promise” 
(Ironside, 1996). It refers to the perceived identity as a mother, as a potential self, and a loss 
of dreams or expectations (Frost et al., 2007). In the literature, we find further expressions and 
metaphors, for example, the concept of griefs (Ironside, 1996, p.69), which refers to the lost 
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past and future, companionship, or one’s own hopes and dreams. In the most extreme case, 
the death of a loved one can reflect a “death of the self” (Charmaz, 1980, p.282).  
The concept of loss of self is also applied to different relationships in which the self is 
affected. These losses include animals (relationship loss), possessions (object loss), and health 
(status loss) as elaborated in section 2. Companion animals are significant others to their 
owners (Belk, 1988; Irvine, 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Sanders, 1990). Losing a pet is very similar 
to losing a human relationship (e.g. Archer, 1999; Archer and Winchester, 1994; Field, Orsini, 
Gavish, and Packman, 2009; Walsh, 2009a). A death of a pet can induce feelings of grief, 
sadness, and even a loss of self comparable to a loss of a human relationship (Sanders, 1990, 
p.662). In addition, physical object loss is linked to the self, because “if possessions are 
viewed as part of the self, it follows that an unintentional loss of possessions should be 
regarded as a loss or lessening of self” (Belk, 1988, p.142). This is particularly true in the case 
of burglary or natural disasters, where grief reactions can be observed (for a review, see Belk, 
1988). In a critical evaluation of Belk (1988), Cohen (1989) indicates the importance of the 
meaning of lost objects and the consequences of loss. The experience of loss of self in the 
event of object loss depends on the subjective significance of the object and how easily it can 
be replaced. 
Finally, illness, especially chronic diseases or disability, affects self-identity and is associated 
with a loss of self (Charmaz, 1983, 1991; Cohen and Eisdorfer, 2001). This is particularly so 
in the case of Alzheimer’s disease or dementia. Both involve the dissolution of the self 
(memory, identity, personality) or a complete loss of self (Cohen and Eisdorfer, 2001, p.22). 
Illness establishes a past and a present self based on a lost way of being (Charmaz, 1991, 
p.229). The suffering of patients with chronic diseases, such as multiple sclerosis, includes 
losses of control and agency, losses of former self-images, living a restricted life, and social 
isolation or experiences of self-discreditation (Charmaz, 1983, p.172). In general, illness 
creates situations in which the person learns new definitions of self and often relinquishes old 
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ones (Charmaz, 1983, p.170). All these experiences are associated with the loss of former 
meanings or attributes of self-images that have been destroyed by illness. Charmaz (1983, 
p.191) sums up the nexus between severe illness and self by pointing out that the language of 
suffering is a “language of loss”.  
Furthermore, grief can follow from losing one’s job (e.g. Archer and Rhodes, 1993, 1995), 
losing one’s home (e.g. Marris, 1986), leaving home (Silver, 1996), or losing touch with one’s 
language (Bostock, 1997). Interestingly, an adult education seminar based on the experiences 
of grief counseling has even been offered to individuals who have experienced the closedown 
of schools in a German city. The course, open to the public, applies the grieving process as a 
mode of understanding the feelings of staff who have faced the closure of a public school – a 
fact that emphasizes the generalization of grief to different kinds of losses, including the loss 
of places or organizational death (Bell and Taylor, 2011).
ii
 
 
5. Psychological Notions of Loss and Self: Similarities and Differences 
I would like to outline psychological notions of loss and self and do so by focusing on 
similarities and differences to the “sociological self” (Callero, 2003, p.121). We can identify 
similarities between the sociological arguments presented above and psychological 
perceptions of the self/identity and loss. One prominent model in psychology is that of 
psychosocial transition (Parkes, 1972) after the death of a significant other. It refers to 
identity change. Habits and thoughts, expectations and roles have to be altered and modified 
due to the “discrepancies between our internal world and the world that now exists for us” 
(Parkes and Prigerson, 2011, p.102). Although it uses a different terminology, this concept at 
its core bears some similarity to Lofland’s threads of connectedness (Lofland, 1985). There is 
also some correspondence with the notion of reconstruction of meaning, as proposed by 
Neimeyer (2001), Neimeyer, Prigerson and Davies (2002), or Gillies and Neimeyer (2006), 
which refers to the process in which a survivor reevaluates, renews, and reconstructs the 
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system of pre-loss meaning, for example, perceptions of self, outlook on the future, or view of 
the world, toward a system of post-loss meaning (Gillies and Neimeyer, 2006, p.54).  
In line with this reasoning, recent psychological models of grieving take into account the loss 
of self through bereavement as implied in symbolic interactionism (Jakoby, 2012). The two-
process theory of grief emphasizes two different responses to loss experiences (Archer, 1999; 
Hofer, 1984; Stroebe and Schut, 1999). First, grief involves a reaction to a specific loss in 
terms of an active response to separation distress (e.g., searching, yearning). Second, grief 
refers to the deprivation of latent functions of the lost relationship. These latent functions of a 
given relationship are similar to the ones Lofland (1982, 1985) describes as threads of 
connectedness. Accordingly, the dual process model of coping (Stroebe and Schut, 1999) 
specifies two different stressors after the loss: a) loss-oriented stressors and b) restoration-
oriented stressors. The first refers to the loss experience itself with respect to the deceased. It 
focuses on the relationship with the deceased and circumstances around the person’s death. 
Restoration-oriented stressors refer to a changed world after the loss. Secondary consequences 
of loss apply to financial stressors, the reorganization of daily life, social isolation, or the 
development of a new identity (Stroebe and Schut, 1999, p.212). This aspect of loss focuses 
on the reintegration of the self and adjustment to a changed world, so-called secondary losses. 
Oscillation between both types of loss experiences is the common modus (Stroebe and Schut, 
1999, p.214-215). The model can be applied to different types of bereavement and is not 
restricted to death. 
Nevertheless and in spite of the similarity of arguments, there are two major differences. In 
psychological and psychiatric bereavement literature, we find negative connotations 
associated with the loss of self. It is contrasted with the ideal of an autonomous and 
independent individual. As Parkes and Prigerson (2011) point out, 
[…] the loss of self is often referred to as a ‘gap,’ ‘it’s a great emptiness,’ […]. These words illustrate 
how the people we love seem to become part of our self, a view that is often held by poets but one that 
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others may find hard to accept – perhaps because it makes us so much more vulnerable. It is more 
comfortable to think of the self as a separate, independent, and therefore safe, entity […]. (p.111) 
 
This quotation reveals the individualistic conception of the self, contrary to the self-concept in 
the Meadian tradition. It unmasks the individualistic framing of the self.  
Additionally, we can identify a medical frame. The reconstruction of meaning after a loss is 
regarded as part of grief work (Parkes and Prigerson, 2011). The “inability to reconstruct a 
meaningful personal reality” represents a symptom of complicated grief in cases where 
reconstruction cannot be achieved (Neimeyer et al., 2002). Further, coping with internal loss 
(self), external loss (social roles), or spiritual loss (attitudes, beliefs, etc.) is included in the 
“tasks of grief” model described by Worden (2009). It is an interesting observation that the 
loss of self is part of a psychiatric diagnosis. A loss of self is considered part of the symptoms 
of the prolonged grief disorder (PGD). Persistence of symptoms, such as the feeling that a part 
of oneself has died, for more than six months after the death is pathologized (see Parkes and 
Prigerson, 2011, p.125-126). In sum, we can identify a medicalization of the loss of self. It is 
labeled negatively and serves as a sign of vulnerability, contrary to the ideal of autonomy and 
independence of the psychological self. Such pathologization is in conflict with the 
sociological self and the naturally appearing and inevitable disruption or loss of self due to the 
sociality of humans and the multiplicity of significant self/other bonds. 
 
6. A General Model of Loss 
After reviewing the concept of loss of self in the wake of bereavement, this section is devoted 
to presenting a general model of loss. An incorporation of the different categories of loss into 
a single model can serve as a starting point for a sociology of loss as a distinct field of study 
rooted in the sociology of self and the sociology of emotions. Figure 1 integrates the previous 
aspects of loss, including the different categories of loss (relationship, status, object) and their 
dimensions, the individual framing of loss based on the meaning of the self/other bond, both 
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of which provide the basis for understanding the significance of loss. In this way the model 
brings together important conclusions of previous theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings in the field of the sociology of loss (Charmaz, 1980, 1997; Lofland, 1982, 1985; 
Marris, 1986). The general framework integrates the notions of significant others, a disruption 
or loss of self, as well as the necessary reorganization of the self or techniques for self-
continuity, respectively.  
The individual framing of the self/other bond is of great importance. This internal process is 
based on the subjective meaning and threads of connectedness (Lofland, 1982, 1985) that link 
the self and the other. It makes the loss a significant loss. Only a significant loss can disrupt 
continuity and meaning in life. The disruption or loss of self can only be understood against 
the background of the self/other bond. In this regard, the actual nature of the “other” is 
irrelevant – the other can be a human, an animal, or a material or immaterial object. The 
feelings of loss for the self are “reflected by this attachment” (Charmaz and Milligan, 2006, 
p.533). Empirical evidence of the significance of the human/other bond is needed to apply the 
concept of loss of self. This argument addresses the critical remarks by Cohen (1989, p.127), 
who fears that the concept of “loss of self (and similar extended self-notions) may be used too 
glibly as a catchall explanation, thus forestalling more careful analysis”. Moreover, there are 
loss norms with regard to the social valuation of different relationships as intimate (Fowlkes, 
1990). This aspect constitutes one of the strengths of the symbolic interactionist account of 
loss: it creates awareness of the role of society in framing a loss. Losses have to be recognized 
as a loss, individually but also collectively. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Furthermore, the model accounts for the so-called reorganization of self (Charmaz, 1980; 
Marris, 1986). Losses lead to discontinuities of the self (Davis, 1979, p.32) and create a need 
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for the continuity and integration of the self (Charmaz, 1980, p.304). After loss experiences, a 
new post-loss self evolves, which can be understood as a “story of personal transformation” 
(Cochran and Claspell, 1987, p.91). Charmaz and Milligan (2006, p.533) point out that the 
process of identity change remains unclear; it represents a “gradual change”. Coping with loss 
requires the change or transformation of the self, the revision of prior attitudes, and the 
development of new meanings, attitudes, and a reorganization of life (Charmaz, 1980, p.298; 
Hahn, 1968, p.130). 
More specifically, different techniques for self-continuity as well as self-reconstruction can be 
identified. They are interconnected. Generally, the emotions of grief and nostalgia serve as 
modes of continuity in cases of loss and transition. Nostalgia supports the continuity of 
identity because of its capacity to relate the past to the present and future. It is a “means” or 
“psychological lens” individuals use in constructing, maintaining, and reconstructing their 
identity (Davis, 1979: 31). Callero (2003) highlights the general role of narratives in the 
process of self-construction: “When disruption is perceived it must be explained, and 
narratives provide a framework” (Callero, 2003, p.124). Grief is a “communicative code” 
(Winkel, 2001) that allows the grieving person to reconstruct his or her biography and engage 
in self-reflection by talking about the dead. There are four manifestations of continuing bonds 
with the deceased that provide continuity with the past: sensing the presence of the dead, 
talking with the dead, conceiving of the dead as moral guides, and talking about the dead 
(Klass and Walter, 2007; see also Unruh, 1983). In this context, memories play a crucial role 
because they “allow continued – if entirely internal – interaction” (Lofland, 1982, p.227). 
Without memory, continuity in life does not exist (Mellibowsky, 1997, p.xv). In the event of 
the death of loved ones, possessions of the deceased can uphold a sense of continuity with the 
past (Belk, 1988; Hallam and Hockey, 2001; Rosenblatt, 2006; Unruh, 1983). More generally, 
individuals can use material objects to construct their identity as coherent and continuous in 
the case of life transitions (Silver, 1996). However, Lofland (1982, p.227) points out that the 
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achievement of continuity of the self may only be temporal and limited; a reorganization of 
the self is inevitable. In the event of significant object loss, the substitution and replacement 
of that which was lost might be more easily possible compared to the loss of a human 
relationship (Cohen, 1989). 
 
7. Conclusions 
Losses are part of the human condition. And these losses are multifaceted – as diverse as 
human bonds can be. Losses are an experience not limited to human relationships only. The 
analysis of loss reveals the sociability of humans and the importance of “others” for self-
construction and self-continuity during a lifetime. In this paper, I have systematically 
reviewed and analyzed the diversity of loss experiences and the notion of loss of self in the 
case of bereavement. In particular, the impact of animals and objects for the development and 
maintenance of the self is highlighted. A sociology of loss has the potential to illuminate the 
universes of meaning and connectedness of the self and other, including person/person, 
person/animal, or person/object relations, both material and immaterial. They are important 
for the construction and continuity of the self in their own right. The structure of self is 
affected by various types of losses. 
My outline of a sociology of loss is predominately rooted at the micro level and closely tied to 
the sociology of self and the sociology of emotions. The macro level is accounted for in terms 
of the social and cultural framing of loss, as pointed out by Hochschild (1979) or Butler 
(2009). Nevertheless, further elaboration on the ability of society to cope with and 
commemorate collective losses is needed. Thus, a sociology of loss broaches the issue of the 
social regulation of loss experiences and specific loss norms – identified by Fowlkes (1990, p. 
637) as the “morality of loss”. Judith Butler’s (2009) idea of a “grievable life” highlights the 
role of society in the acknowledgement of a loss. Hierarchies of loss and the consequences for 
the recognition of the grieving individual have to be evaluated critically. Therefore, a 
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sociology of loss calls attention to the normative labeling of extended family relationships or 
pets as “less important or trivial losses”, as Marris (1986, p.27) points out. Society has to 
provide means for feeling and expressing grief regardless of the kinds of losses involved. 
Obviously not all losses are significant and disrupt the self (Cohen, 1989). Therefore, the 
individual framing of the loss and the subjective meaning of the self/other bond is essential. 
The identification of a loss of self can only be understood against this background.  
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TABLE 1 
Categories of loss  
 
Author(s) Losses 
Engel (1960) loved person 
cherished possession 
job 
status 
home 
country 
ideal 
part of the body 
Wallace (1973) object 
relationship 
status 
way of being 
Marris (1986) personal relationship 
predictable social context 
interpretable world 
Charmaz (1980) person 
freedom 
physical function 
social status 
reputation  
Charmaz and Milligan (2006) animate objects (persons or animals) 
inanimate objects (artifacts and places) 
nonphysical objects (language, culture, ideals) 
Horwitz and Wakefield (2007) attachment 
status 
meaning 
Note: Own illustration. 
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FIGURE 1:  
A General Model of Loss (own illustration) 
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i
 An identity represents a distinct part of the self (Callero, 2003, p.125). Identity theory (Burke, 1980; Stryker, 
1980; Stryker and Burke, 2000) defines the self as the sum of multiple identities. The term identity refers to 
internalized meanings and expectations according to the individual’s social roles (role identity) and network 
positions. These internalized meanings and expectations represent “sub-units of the global concept of self” 
(Burke, 1980, p.18). This extension takes into account that individuals engage in specific social networks and 
perform multiple roles according to these relationships (Stryker and Burke, 2000). In this paper, it is not possible 
to outline the discourse about different types of identity in any detail, provide further analytical distinctions of 
the self, and elaborate more deeply the structural tradition of symbolic interactionism (Stryker, 1980). This 
pertains also to the discussion of the “personal” or “core” versus the “social” self (e.g. Gubrium and Holstein, 
2000). 
ii
 See http://bildungswerkaachen.de/index.php/bildung/kursliste/2/9/243, accessed September 17, 2013. 
